Data associations and the protection of reputation online in Australia by Joyce, Daniel
Original Research Article
Data associations and the protection
of reputation online in Australia
Daniel Joyce
Abstract
This article focuses upon defamation law in Australia and its struggles to adjust to the digital landscape, to illustrate the
broader challenges involved in the governance and regulation of data associations. In many instances, online publication
will be treated by the courts in a similar fashion to traditional forms of publication. What is more contentious is the
question of who, if anyone, should bear the responsibility for digital forms of defamatory publication which result not
from an individual author’s activity online but rather from algorithmic associations. This article seeks, in part, to analyse
this question, by reference to the Australian case law and associated scholarship regarding search engine liability.
Reflecting on the tensions involved here offers us a fresh perspective on defamation law through the conceptual lens
of data associations. Here the focus of the article shifts to explore some wider questions posed for defamation law by big
data. Defamation law may come to play a significant role in emerging frameworks for algorithmic accountability, but these
developments also call into question many of its traditional concepts and assumptions. It may be time to think differently
about defamation and to consider its interrelationship with privacy, speech and data protection more fully. As a result, I
conclude that the courts and policymakers need to engage more deeply and explicitly with the rationale(s) for the
protection of reputation and that more thought needs to be given to changing conceptions of reputation in the context
of data associations.
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Introduction
This article has resulted from an invitation to think
about the protection of reputation as an element of a
broader framework for the governance of data associ-
ations. It draws upon some recent case law in Australia
to trigger wider reﬂection about the need for defam-
ation law (in a variety of contexts) to engage with the
theme of data associations. It is in this sense a reﬂective
piece rather than a doctrinal analysis. I approach
defamation law not as a private lawyer, but from the
perspective of media law and its current entanglement
with the digital. Defamation law scholarship, much of it
doctrinal and private law focused, is beginning to engage
more fully with comparative law and with questions of
jurisdiction in the private international law sense, and it
is also productive to begin to think about this subject
from the perspective of data, big data and data protec-
tion. This article is written in the spirit of such enquiry.
The article begins, in the ﬁrst section, by contextua-
lising the broader theme of data associations in light of
Australian defamation law’s response to the varied
challenges of the Internet. The discussion then moves,
in the second section, to explore a few contemporary
cases illustrating some of the conceptual problems
involved by reference to the speciﬁc problem of
search engine liability. Search engine liability is a cur-
rent concern in the case law and for my purposes it
oﬀers a useful illustration of defamatory matter poten-
tially arising as a result of data associations, where
defamatory matter is connected with an individual
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through the operation of an algorithm. It is not my
intention to deﬁnitively set out legal doctrine in this
shifting area. I use the case law as illustration of broader
diﬃculties faced by the courts in grappling with data
associations and because I think it is useful to think
diﬀerently about defamation law.
This prompts deeper reﬂection in the third section.
Have the cases tended to focus on complex questions
regarding publication and jurisdiction to the detriment
of other equally important areas such as identiﬁcation
and meaning? Does the theme of data associations
draw these other elements of the cause of action more
fully into view? Building on this conceptual reﬂection,
and prompted by earlier analysis of the case law regard-
ing data associations, the fourth section reﬂects more
broadly upon the challenge oﬀered by big data to
defamation law. Do defamatory data associations, as
in the case of search engines, provide a new way of
thinking about the protection of reputation and the
traditional principles of defamation law? Here I begin
to articulate some new ways of considering the concep-
tual foundations of the subject. I argue that defamation
law is centrally placed within debates over how to
develop forms of algorithmic accountability. This
potential role, however, prompts the need to address
deeper questions within domestic systems of defam-
ation law concerning their underlying rationale(s) and
assumptions, and also regarding the interrelationship
between defamation law, privacy, speech and data pro-
tection. To set the scene for this later discussion of def-
amation law’s engagement with data associations, ﬁrst I
turn to consider how Australian defamation law has
struggled with the Internet and then with search engines
in particular.
Australian defamation law, online
publication and automaticity
The tort of defamation is said to involve the balancing
of two key interests – reputation and free speech. In the
Australian context, without a bill of rights or more
direct constitutional protection for speech, and with
no free-standing cause of action for invasion of privacy,
defamation law is arguably the dominant area of media
law. But it is a costly, esoteric and rather unpredictable
vehicle, and many increasingly argue for reform and
suggest that in fundamental ways it is no longer ﬁt
for task (Descheemaeker, 2009; Rolph, 2016: 1–7).
The rapid development of the Internet along
with associated changes occurring in the digital media
landscape has challenged and aﬃrmed the principles
of media law in a variety of areas, prompting a range
of regulatory proposals and responses. We talk of
convergence and the need for technology-neutral and
converged forms of regulation. There are eﬀorts to
embrace de-professionalisation and the rise of citizen
media, seeking functional rather than professional priv-
ileges and status in order to protect the bloggers. And
there are also the reverse, eﬀorts to re-professionalise in
the face of change, and to challenge the idea that all
with the capacity to publish are ‘the media’. Some call
for the end of formal regulation – as in the death of
privacy. Others argue that we need stricter protection
for privacy and better integration of the uneven, and
at times conﬂictual, media law mechanisms (Australian
Law Reform Commission, 2014). Some call for a focus
on data or information in our media law, so that areas
such as privacy protection should come to be seen
as ‘information rules’, or argue that defamation law
needs to better take account of data protection juris-
prudence (Erdos, 2014). Others see new possibilities for
softer forms of self-regulation and reputation manage-
ment in the digital media landscape, or in ideas such as
a right to reply or even a right to be forgotten.
Defamation law has, from its origins, grappled with
questions regarding the development of communica-
tions technologies – notably the printing press.
Recent scholarship and case law has focused on the
applicability of defamation law principles in an online
environment, but to date little has been said explicitly
about data and defamation, though this has become an
important theme for privacy scholarship.
Here I deﬁne data simply as information in digital
form, thus capturing all forms of digital media and
online publication. Computing allows algorithmic ana-
lysis of massive sets of data – commonly referred
to as ‘big data’. This results in increasing power and
inﬂuence being wielded by companies involved in
the information economy and in developing tools for
algorithmic data association and the collation and com-
modiﬁcation of big data sets. As Frank Pasquale
(2015a: 8) argues: ‘authority is increasingly expressed
algorithmically. Decisions that used to be based on
human reﬂection are now made automatically’.
Pasquale (2015a: 59) argues of the companies like
Google Inc, which have developed the dominant mech-
anisms of search: ‘These new masters of media are more
than just conveniences. Thanks both to their compe-
tence and our inertia, they often determine what possi-
bilities reach our awareness at all’. For defamation law,
the Internet and the accessibility of self-publication,
searchability, increased interactivity and citizen-gener-
ated content have prompted a degree of soul-searching.
Should these developments call traditional defamation
law principles into question? There is a certain ‘shock
of the new’ excitement about the application of defam-
ation law to green ﬁelds, which blends with the reform-
ist emphasis in much of contemporary defamation law
scholarship. But on closer inspection defamation law’s
principles, at least in Australia, remain fairly intact.
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This can be seen in one element of the cause of
action – publication. Publication has been traditionally
construed very broadly. As Isaacs J noted in an early
Australian High Court case: ‘[t]o publish a libel is to
convey by some means to the mind of another
the defamatory sense embodied in the vehicle’ (Webb
v Bloch, 1928, at p. 363). Practically everything is a
publication – so why not a tweet or indeed a re-tweet
or share on Facebook (covered by the principle of
repetition)?
Commonly those with control over, who facilitate or
assent to, publication can be liable for it as contributing
to the publication in the broad sense required. It is in
this way that editors, newspaper proprietors and prin-
ters traditionally have been held to be publishers along
with journalists. But publication can also arise from
omission (or authorisation) as in the case of Byrne v
Deane, which involved failure to take down allegedly
defamatory verse posted on a golf club’s wall for sev-
eral days where the club rules provided that no notice
or placard shall be posted in the club premises without
the consent of the secretary. This line of authority has
been relevant in the case of Internet Service Providers
and their failure to remove defamatory material but is
less applicable in the context of search engines. The
policy-based defence of innocent dissemination gives
rise to a further category of subordinate distributors
(or secondary publishers) such as newsagents and
libraries. In certain contexts, the defence will apply
where dissemination occurs without knowledge of the
defamatory matter published (there is also statutory
expression of the defence, for example Defamation
Act 2005 (NSW), s. 32). This variety in terms of how
one can be deemed to have published (or not) defama-
tory material has resulted in mixed results in the cases
and points to the need for fact speciﬁcity in consider-
ation of the question of publication as it arises in the
context of diﬀerent kinds of Internet intermediary cases
– search engine publication will necessarily be treated
diﬀerently to Internet Service Provider or platform pub-
lications (Rolph, 2016: 162; Google v Trkulja, 2016, at
[285]). The relevance of notice in determining liability in
the latter two categories of publication (Byrne v Deane
and Emmens v Pottle) is apparent, but ‘for diﬀerent rea-
sons’ (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [243], [283]).
In terms of how to address the challenge of jurisdic-
tion online, for the Australian courts, every publication
gives rise to a separate cause of action (Dow Jones v
Gutnick). Only the area of defences, such as triviality
and innocent dissemination, and consideration of statu-
tory protections for Internet Service Providers and
Internet Content Hosts give rise to more ambiguity.
And in this area it has been left to the Australian legis-
lature to attempt to reform the law, where currently
some provision is made by Clause 91(1), Schedule 5
of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). Despite
some unsettled areas, the traditional principles regard-
ing publication have proved remarkably resilient, and
the defence of innocent dissemination, which protects
certain classes of subordinate distributors without
knowledge of the defamatory meaning, is the main
avenue for digital media defendants to argue their
case. Thus, following a review of initial decisions relat-
ing to publication and innocent dissemination in the
context of the Internet, David Rolph (2010: 563)
reﬂected that ‘while internet technologies have brought
about a revolution in communications, their impact on
defamation law has not been equally radical’. The jur-
isprudence, however, remains dynamic (Rolph, 2016:
162–166). It also points to the possibility and need for
statutory intervention and reform over time.
Yet automaticity has proved diﬃcult for the courts
in determining whether algorithmic search engine
results constitute defamatory publication through asso-
ciation. An early and inﬂuential English case illustrated
that automaticity might prove a hurdle for plaintiﬀs to
overcome. The decision indicated that search engine
operators could not be held liable for defamatory algo-
rithmic publication or defamation by data association
(Designtechnica). In the context of the facts of the case,
Eady J emphasised the lack of control which Google
had over the material available on the Internet and over
the terms entered by users of its search engine. Eady J
(Designtechnica, 2011, at p. 1757 at [50]–[51]) stated:
When a search is carried out by a web user via the
Google search engine it is clear. . . that there is no
human input from the third defendant [Google Inc].
None of its oﬃcers or employees take part in the
search. It is performed automatically in accordance
with computer programmes. . . It has not authorised
or caused the snippet to appear on the user’s screen
in any meaningful sense. It has merely, by the provision
of its search service, played the role of a facilitator.
Eady J concluded that Google as a search engine oper-
ator must be treated diﬀerently to a website host who
can remove oﬀending material more readily. Ultimately
then Eady J was unwilling to ﬁnd that Google was a
publisher either in terms of ‘authorship or acquiescence’
and whether before or after notiﬁcation (Designtechnica,
2011, at pp. 1760, 1773 at [64], [124]).
I now turn to examine some subsequent Australian
cases, which have also addressed the issue of defamatory
liability in the context of data association in the form of
Google’s search engine. This case law has drawn upon
decisions in comparative contexts such as England and
Wales, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Canada. For rea-
sons of economy I do not intend here to address all of
those comparative cases (see for example, A v Google
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New Zealand; Yeung v Google) but it has been evident
that this is an area where, perhaps due to the novelty and
complexity of the issues raised, comparative examples
have been of beneﬁt to the courts.
Some contemporary Australian
decisions involving the Google
search engine
Several contemporary Australian cases involving
Google illustrate the potential for divergence in this
area. It is increasingly clear that not all Internet con-
texts, nor indeed all forms of Internet intermediary
liability, ought to be treated in similar fashion. The
Google search engine itself has given rise to diﬀerent
modes of potential liability for distinct aspects such as
the autocomplete function, hyperlinks, snippets and
images resulting. Whilst all involve data association
of some kind, they may not all constitute publication
in terms of defamation law or they may be charac-
terised as diﬀerent forms of publication. There is also
evidence of a shift in approach by some judges towards
the capacity of Google to remove defamatory material,
and hence a mixed view of whether in fact the data
association underlying the search engine is automatic
(even passive) or able to be actively controlled and
directed.
For example, Beach J of the Supreme Court of
Victoria considered the liability of search engines as
publishers in an important case, Trkulja v Google
(No 5). This case saw Australian law begin to diverge
from earlier decisions in England and Wales which had
questioned whether it was appropriate for Internet
intermediaries to be considered as a publisher (Rolph,
2010: 571–573).
During 2009 material was available on the Internet
concerning the plaintiﬀ Mr Trkulja. Images and an art-
icle online (relating to an attempt on his life) which
came up through a simple Google search for Michael
Trkulja connected him with ﬁgures in the Melbourne
criminal underworld, giving rise to imputations that he
was a prominent ﬁgure in that underworld, that he was
so involved that an attempt on his life had been planned
and so on. The defendants Google Inc LLC and Google
Australia P/L denied publication and pleaded defences
of innocent dissemination at common law and under
statute.
A jury found that Trkulja had established an entitle-
ment as to damages against Google Inc in respect of
certain of the images suggesting his involvement with
the Melbourne criminal underworld. However, Google
Inc successfully established the defence of innocent dis-
semination in relation to the matters arising on the web.
Google applied for judgement notwithstanding the
jury’s verdict by way of a non-obstante application.
Google Inc claimed not to be a publisher in relation
to the images. Much was made in argument by counsel
for Google Inc about the automaticity of the Google
search engine and the possibility for avoidance of
responsibility where the role played was passive and
that of an intermediary.
Beach J (Trkulja v Google (No 5), 2012, at pp. 13–14
at [18], [20]) found, however, that:
The jury were entitled to conclude that Google
Inc intended to publish the material that its automated
systems produced. . . It was a page of Google Inc’s cre-
ation – put together as a result of the Google Inc search
engine working as it was intended to work by those
who wrote the relevant computer programs. . . If
Google Inc’s submission was to be accepted then,
while this page might on one view be the natural and
probable consequence of the material published on the
source page from which it is derived, there would be no
actual original publisher of this page.
Beach J distinguished earlier decisions, reasserting a
broad approach to what might constitute search
engine publication. Ultimately in his Honour’s view:
‘it was open to the jury to conclude that Google Inc
was a publisher – even if it did not have notice of the
content of the material about which complaint was
made’ (Beach J in Trkulja v Google (No 5), 2012, at
p. 18 at [30]).
A more recent decision in NSW yielded a diﬀerent
result through a focus upon case management and pro-
portionality principles. McCallum J stayed proceedings
involving Google Inc as a defendant in the matter of
Bleyer v Google, in part because the cost would be dis-
proportionate to what was at stake. In that case the plain-
tiﬀ Mr Bleyer alleged that the search engine generated
snippets and hyperlinks which conveyed imputations of
criminality, though the pleadings were fairly vague as to
the particulars of publication (Bleyer v Google, 2014, at
[9]–[10]). Google had also acted to remove the oﬀending
URLs. Her Honour also noted that:
One of the diﬃculties with a defamation claim based on
the publication of search results using Google or other
search engines is that the relevant audience is necessar-
ily conﬁned to the class of persons who have under-
taken a Google search using terms that identify the
relevant defamatory web page according to the search
engine’s algorithms. (McCallum J in Bleyer v Google,
2014, at [31])
By ﬁnding against the plaintiﬀ on the basis of case
management and proportionality reasoning, the pos-
ition taken by McCallum J in Bleyer illustrates a shift
away from the approach in Trkulja (No 5) and Beach
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J’s characterisation of Google’s search engine, and back
towards the earlier English decisions of Eady J, which
in a range of contexts (some focused on Internet Service
Providers and blogging platforms), emphasised the
common law’s diﬃculty with defamation via intermedi-
aries. Her Honour states that:
. . . there is no human input in the application of
the Google search engine apart from the creation of
the algorithm. I would respectfully disagree with the
conclusion reached by Beach J in Trkulja that the
performance of the function of the algorithm in that
circumstance is capable of establishing liability as a
publisher at common law. I would adopt the English
line of authority to the eﬀect that, at least prior to
notiﬁcation of a complaint. . . Google Inc cannot be
liable as a publisher of the results produced by its
search engine. (McCallum J in Bleyer v Google, 2014,
at [83])
Uncertainty in the Australian common law continues
with some cases more recently again adopting a wider
view of Google’s liability in line with Trkulja (No 5).
In Trkulja v Google (2015) Google ran arguments that it
was not a publisher and that as a search engine it
should be immune from suit. Such arguments illustrate
the public signiﬁcance of Google’s litigation strategy
and see the company playing an important role in
attempting to shape the developing law in this area
across jurisdictions. Google’s arguments were rejected.
McDonald J followed the authority in Trkulja (No 5),
distinguishing the earlier English decisions like
Designtechnica and stating that ‘Google’s primary con-
tention that, as a search engine proprietor it cannot be a
publisher (either before or after receiving notice of any
alleged defamatory publication) is not supported by
any authority’ (Trkulja v Google, 2015, at [6]). Like
Beach J, McDonald J adopted a pragmatic view, con-
cluding that ‘[e]ither Google is the publisher of the
material complained of or there is no publisher at all’
(Trkulja v Google, 2015, at [17], see also [45]). Google
was found to be in control of its search engine results
and motivated by ‘commercial objectives’ (Trkulja v
Google, 2015, at [46]). The breadth of potential liability
articulated in earlier cases like Webb and Thompson
ensured that the defence of innocent dissemination
was not available and that liability could stretch to
accommodate this case of publication by data associ-
ation ‘even if one has not read the material and there-
fore can have no intention to publish speciﬁc words’
(Trkulja v Google, 2015, at [49], [59], [75]).
Similar conclusions were reached by Blue J in the
South Australian case of Duﬀy v Google. Blue J rejected
the argument advanced by Google ‘that a defendant
can only ever be a publisher if the defendant authorises
or accepts responsibility for the publication’ (Duﬀy v
Google, 2015, at [184]). In Duﬀy v Google automaticity
was no bar to liability so long as Google was notiﬁed
and had been given a reasonable time to respond (Duﬀy
v Google, 2015, at [206]–[209]).
Not all the recent authority points in this direction.
At the time of writing, Trkulja v Google (2015) has been
appealed successfully with the potential for the issues
to reach the High Court of Australia in due course. In
Google v Trkulja (2016) the Victorian Court of Appeal
again considered the issue of search engine liability and
publication, allowing Google’s appeal. The decision
provides a useful overview of the Australian and com-
parative case law, emphasising the need for conceptual
clarity and fact speciﬁcity when approaching the com-
plex questions surrounding defamation and the
Internet (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [152], [227]–[231],
[285]). Indeed, the Court states that ‘to speak of the
operation of defamation principles in the context of
the Internet is an oversimpliﬁcation which is apt to
mislead’ (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [99], see also
[152]). Equally the decision points to the need to appre-
ciate the diﬀerent forms of liability for publication,
starting with Webb v Bloch with its broad approach
of contribution to publication and then distinguishing
the Byrne v Deane form of publication by omission (or
authorisation) and the category of secondary publica-
tion associated with Emmens v Pottle, Thompson and
the development of the defence of innocent dissemin-
ation (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [100]–[131]).
In considering and contrasting multiple forms of use
of the web, the Court notes that
the interaction between a user and the Google search
engine is quite diﬀerent to the interaction between a
user and Facebook or Twitter or the like. . . Google
neither compiles the search terms nor any webpages
or images which are identiﬁed in response. (Google v
Trkulja, 2016, at [177])
Emphasis is placed upon the dynamic and multifaceted
operation of Google’s algorithm (drawing upon Google
v ACCC, 2013). Google drew on this in argument also
pointing to the ways in which search results and auto-
complete predictions are responsive to prior user activ-
ity (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [218]).
After a careful analysis of the case law, and rejection
of the characterisation of Google’s search engine as
‘passive’, the Court returns to ﬁrst principles, stating
that a search engine is a publisher as ‘a participant in
a chain of distribution of material’ but that it ‘should be
accounted a secondary publisher’ and thereby not
caught by the repetition rule (Google v Trkulja, 2016,
at [348]–[349], [357]). Consequently, a defence of inno-
cent dissemination will be available in the period prior
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to notiﬁcation (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [353], [357]).
Arguing that too much attention has been given to
intention, the Court notes that ours is ‘a world where
automated action is becoming, if it is not already, the
norm’ (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [350]–[351]).
The analysis then turns to the element of defamatory
meaning. Given the ubiquity and nature of the Google
search engine, the Court ﬁnds that ‘the plaintiﬀ would
have no prospect at all of establishing that the images
matter conveyed any of the defamatory imputations
relied upon’ (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [391]). This
builds on earlier analysis of the particular images
generated by search and the wide and varied range of
persons captured, from underworld ﬁgures to police
oﬃcers, actors and barristers (Google v Trkulja, 2016,
at [25]). The decision follows Duﬀy in determining ‘that
autocomplete predictions are incapable of being
defamatory’ and also due to their responsiveness to
past searches (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [393]). The
web matter is also found not to have carried the imput-
ations alleged (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at [396], [404]).
The Court concludes that the problems raised by
search engines are ‘acute’ and have ‘led to conﬂicting
analyses in the common law world’ (Google v Trkulja,
2016, at [412]). Given the social utility of search and the
real possibility for defamatory imputations to arise in
context, a pragmatic, fact speciﬁc and balanced
approach is preferred (Google v Trkulja, 2016, at
[413]). Any question of immunity, as raised in the
appeal, should be ‘conferred by legislation’ (Google v
Trkulja, 2016, at [414]).
Defamatory meaning and identification
And so, viewing the protection of reputation through
the lens of data association, points not only to ques-
tions concerning publication (and jurisdiction), but also
to the two remaining elements of the cause of action –
defamatory meaning and identiﬁcation. If we view the
matter as being the communication via the indexing of
a plaintiﬀ with potentially defamatory content by asso-
ciation, then we might ask how seriously are we, or
more speciﬁcally the ordinary reasonable reader,
to take such association? There is authority for this
form of associative defamatory meaning, for example,
in the English case of Garbett where defamatory mean-
ing arose through the juxtaposition of photographs
and text, thereby damaging the reputation of an inno-
cent outdoor photographer who was associated
with neighbouring text and an image suggestive of
his involvement with the showing, taking or exhibition
of indecent photos (Garbett v Hazell, Watson & Viney).
Traditionally defamation law has allowed for defama-
tory imputations to arise both on the words themselves
taken literally, but also by reading in between the lines,
or even by inference when comprehended in the light of
extrinsic facts. There are of course limits in terms of how
far the courts will allow such inferences to be drawn,
but the core idea is that much of our communication
involves both direct and indirect forms of association,
therefore to require only direct identiﬁcation or to
require the defamatory meaning to be explicit, would
miss the nature of our communication and reduce the
interpretive nuance required to reductive and overly for-
malistic terms.
But there is also a desire in appellate decisions to
rationalise and to some extent to rein in the complexity of
defamation law. Addressing the variance of approaches
to what constitutes defamation at common law, a
powerful majority of the High Court of Australia in
the case of Chesterton has stated a general test for
defamatory meaning in the following terms:
The likelihood that the ordinary reasonable person may
think the less of a plaintiﬀ because of the imputations is
assessed by reference to that person’s general know-
ledge and their knowledge of standards held by the
general community, as they may apply to what is said
about the plaintiﬀ. Because such a person can be
expected to apply the standards of the general commu-
nity, he or she may be described as ‘‘decent’’.
The standards are not limited to those of a moral or
ethical kind. (Radio 2UE Sydney P/L v Chesterton,
2009, at p. 484)
The scholarly work of Lawrence McNamara also
points to the need for reform and argues for a stream-
lined (and general) test for defamatory meaning, but
with a diﬀerent emphasis upon damage to reputation
as damage to ‘a person’s moral status. . . in the eyes of
the community’ (McNamara, 2007: 229–232).
The High Court ﬁrst considered publication in the
context of the Internet in the earlier case of Gutnick,
clarifying the multiple publication approach on the
basis that injury was suﬀered in the comprehension of
the defamatory matter, in the jurisdiction where the
online material was downloaded or viewed, rather
than where it was created. In that decision the majority
of the Court usefully stated that:
Harm to reputation is done when a defamatory publi-
cation is comprehended by the reader, the listener, or
the observer. Until then, no harm is done by it. This
being so it would be wrong to treat publication as if it
were a unilateral act on the part of the publisher alone.
It is not. It is a bilateral act – in which the publisher
makes it available and a third party has it available for
his or her comprehension. (Gleeson CJ, McHugh,
Gummow and Hayne JJ in Dow Jones v Gutnick,
2002, at p. 600)
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In the same case Kirby J addressed the speciﬁcity of the
Internet context for defamation law in some detail,
noting the data dimension, and observing that an art-
icle published in an online database ‘becomes part of
the digital collection of data known as a web page’
(Kirby J in Dow Jones v Gutnick, 2002, at p. 617). His
Honour, whilst aware of the need for reform, indicated
that this should be undertaken by the legislature and
perhaps even take the form of multilateral agreement.
While attentive to the characteristics of the Internet and
to data-driven forms of publication emerging online,
Kirby J adopted a cautious approach in terms of
whether wholesale reform was required and, in particu-
lar, whether the common law was the right vehicle for
such reform. Arguing against technology-speciﬁc rules
in a common law context, his Honour stated: ‘[a] legal
rule expressed in terms of the Internet might be very
soon out of date’ (Kirby J in Dow Jones v Gutnick,
2002, at p. 631).
Perhaps then in light of the common law’s desire for
generality in terms of principle and speciﬁcity in terms
of application (in a fact-sensitive manner), there should
be a more robust approach taken to not just who can
provide a remedy to those defamed by data association
online, but to whether the wide view taken of identiﬁ-
cation and meaning should be further extended in big
data contexts, where meaning derives from indirect
association, and where presumably many of us might
be unhappy with who or what we might be associated
algorithmically. We could ask more pointedly not just
whether Google should be a publisher in such contexts,
but whether in fact to be defamed by data associations
of this nature is to be defamed at all, and to what
degree association in the big data environment is
to be taken to constitute identiﬁcation (for a recent
decision regarding identiﬁcation in the online context
see Pedavoli). This kind of ﬁrst principles approach
can be seen in Google v Trkulja 2016 and in Bleyer v
Google with its reliance on proportionality and case
management.
McCallum J’s signiﬁcant decision in Bleyer v Google
also points usefully to whether defamation by data
association in the context of search engines is so
stretched in certain cases as to veer towards specula-
tion, and whether having defamation law address these
concerns is proportionate to the kind of injury to repu-
tation alleged (Bleyer v Google, 2014, at [31]). On this
aspect there is an emerging literature in the aftermath
of the European decision of Google Spain regarding ‘the
right to be forgotten’ which emphasises not the rele-
vance of defamation law to such contexts, but rather
data protection laws and the European approach to
data protection in particular (Erdos, 2014; Karapapa
and Borghi, 2015). It may be the case that despite the
common law’s willingness to stretch its already wide
view of the elements of the cause of action in defam-
ation law to new digital contexts, that over time such
contexts may be seen to relate less clearly to the pro-
tection of reputation as traditionally understood, and
more to statutory data protection with its conceptual
roots lying closer to privacy law. This is an emerging
trend in some English defamation scholarship which
operates against the background of the common law,
statutory reform and regional human rights and data
protection frameworks (Erdos, 2014).
The broader challenge of big data
Perhaps more signiﬁcant in the longer term for def-
amation law, than attempting to apply principles
of publication and co-ordinate jurisdictional questions
online, will be time spent determining what might be
the relevance of our increasing reliance on data associ-
ations. This question points to the need to take a
wider view of the challenge of digitisation in terms of
defamation law’s reliance on concepts such as ‘commu-
nity’, ‘reputation’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘identiﬁcation’.
A related policy question emerges: do we now rely on
the instantaneous exchange of information to such an
extent that the protection of reputation appears to
threaten the mechanisms of free speech and freedom
of information made possible by the Internet? This
latter question is at issue in a signiﬁcant case decided
in the Canadian Supreme Court, Crookes v Newton.
In that case, the court looked at whether hyperlinks
should on their own terms be considered as a form of
publication, or whether they were more usefully char-
acterised as a new form of footnote or reference which
should not attract liability due to broader interests in
the sharing of information and ideas in an information
society. The decision is important for its recourse to
broader public policy concerns with maintaining
a free and open information society. The case is illus-
trative of a strong, speech-protective approach to deter-
mining online liability for defamatory content, which
is sensitive to the speciﬁc interaction of law and tech-
nology in context.
Thus, we can see that the development of the
Internet and the turn to reliance on big data gives rise
to a range of practical and theoretical questions.
Some initial challenges include the following. Do data
associations engage defamation principles or are these
developments more usefully matched with related areas
such as data protection laws or privacy? Where defam-
ation law might be engaged, how is it to interact with
these other regulatory forms? Does big data call into
question the already rather lite rationale for the protec-
tion of reputation in terms of either honour, moral
status, dignity, sociality or citizenship (Aplin and
Bosland, 2016; Howarth, 2011; McNamara, 2007;
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Post, 1986; Richardson, 2013; Rolph, 2008)? Does this
transition in fact point to the need to think through the
interests at stake diﬀerently, perhaps involving more
attention to speech, privacy and information ﬂows?
In these terms the challenge and opportunity of big
data should see the common law look not only to its
pre-existing analytical categories, but also to deeper
questions regarding the value of its protections.
Viktor Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Kenneth Cukier
(2013: 2, 6) write of big data as ‘the ability of society
to harness information in novel ways to produce
insights or goods and services of signiﬁcant value’.
More thought needs to be given as to how this value
can be balanced with values such as speech or privacy
or reputation, but also whether big data in these terms
is communicative in the dialogic sense or more con-
cerned with prediction and problem-solving.
A further challenge lies in how we perceive the
rationale for defamation law. Is it to vindicate one’s
reputation in public as well as to console for hurt feel-
ings, or does it track (in some sense) with a more pro-
prietary conception of reputation as brand or value
which relates less to dignity and more to the potential
for commodiﬁcation or celebrity (Rolph, 2008;
Varuhas, 2014). For example, in arguing that there is
a distinct form of ‘reputation as celebrity’ David Rolph
(2008: 37, 38) has written that reputation ‘can be con-
ceptualised not only as a social and an economic con-
struct, but. . . also as a media construct’.
The reality of the digital archive and its threat of
permanence also prompts re-evaluation of the remedy
of damages. At the evidentiary level data association
promises to specify reputational injury in clearer terms
than the law has required. At present the common law
presumes damage. Intention is only relevant in terms of
defeasance of defences such as comment or opinion and
qualiﬁed privilege. There has been important recent
scholarship which has attempted to analyse and even
reformulate the rationale for protection of reputation
in the digital context, moving beyond the dated frame-
work of honour (Richardson, 2013) and towards recog-
nition of sociality as underpinning the need to protect
against the ostracism involved in damage to reputation
online (Howarth, 2011). With human rights frameworks
oﬀering a mechanism of balancing by reference to a
broader range of interests including speech and privacy,
dignity remains an important though rather vague
rationale. As Richardson notes, many contemporary
instances of online reputational damage ‘do not involve
false defamatory utterances’ (Richardson, 2013: 55).
It may be time to begin thinking diﬀerently about
defamation, as the example of defamatory data associ-
ations (and search engines) suggests. The cases I have
examined, illustrate both the sense that this is a
developing area where reform and further development
of the law may be needed, but also that in many
instances the traditional principles are being applied
in a pragmatic and orthodox manner, though with
mixed and highly fact-speciﬁc results. This article has
attempted to analyse these developments, but also to
point to the need for fresh thinking conceptually.
Societal understanding of the signiﬁcance of reputa-
tional damage (and perhaps also the deﬁnition of
defamatory meaning) is shifting and the commodiﬁca-
tion and secrecy of reputation management draws into
view. As Pasquale (2015a: 14 and see further chapter 2)
notes: ‘The success of individuals, businesses, and their
products depends heavily on the synthesis of data and
perceptions into reputation. In ever more settings, repu-
tation is determined by secret algorithms processing
inaccessible data’. This indicates that while defamation
law itself has adapted to the Internet in fairly trad-
itional and predictable ways, it may come to play a
central role in regulating the new digital economy. At
the very least, this points to a need to give more
thought to the suitability of traditional defamation
law principles in this emerging context. To this end I
have examined a limited category of data association
cases involving search engines and algorithmic liability.
These cases illustrate some divergence of approaches
and a largely pragmatic response to defamation in the
context of big data. Such pragmatism needs to be
balanced with deeper conceptual analysis and a wider
view of the possibility of regulation in this area, where
defamation law must increasingly engage with privacy,
speech and data protection.
Conclusion
While the big data environment may elude direct rela-
tional causality, and threatens at times to overload and
disorient, its methods of correlation and association
appear to align closely with the breadth of traditional
defamation law concepts of publication and identiﬁca-
tion. The harder question is whether this is desirable.
That data associations bring dangers and risk is clear
(boyd and Crawford, 2011; Clarke, 2014; Mayer-
Scho¨nberger and Cukier, 2013, Chapter 8; Pasquale,
2015b). Defamation law in Australia, and elsewhere,
is beginning to consider this in relation to protection
of reputation, but it is evident that this forms a small
part of what must be a broader development of ‘algo-
rithmic accountability’ (boyd and Crawford, 2011;
Pasquale, 2015b). Within the conceptual terrain of def-
amation law, as the cases examined illustrate, there
should be a wider view taken of what is at stake. In
addition to publication and jurisdiction, the courts
should give greater weight to the role of identiﬁcation
and to the generation of defamatory meaning in the
context of data associations. In looking at how
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innocent dissemination is to operate as a defence, a
clearer sense of its rationale, rather than its pre-existing
technical categories and their applicability will assist.
While defamation law may not always be the most suit-
able regulatory vehicle, it remains a centrally placed
one, and in some surprising ways shares much with
data associations. Both are ‘relational’, both engage
but also extend further than the terrain of privacy,
and perhaps most signiﬁcantly both rely ultimately
on interpretation and the generation of meaning.
For defamation law as for big data, it should be remem-
bered as boyd and Crawford (2011: 6) caution, that:
‘Interpretation is at the center of data analysis.
Regardless of the size of the data set, it is subject to
limitation and bias. Without those biases and limita-
tions being understood and outlined, misinterpretation
is the result’. This article has focused upon defamation
law in Australia as a means of illustrating the broader
challenges involved in the governance and regulation of
data associations. I have focused on contemporary
cases dealing with the liability of search engine oper-
ators such as Google Inc for defamatory content. These
cases illustrate both the resilience of traditional defam-
ation law principles and their pragmatic use by the
courts to determine accountability for algorithmic
data association. My focus has largely been upon pub-
lication and certain relevant defences such as innocent
dissemination. But I have also tried to use the lens of
data associations to begin to think diﬀerently about
domestic systems of defamation law as they grapple
with the challenges and opportunities posed by the
Internet. These developments point to the need to think
more deeply about the value of reputation in these new
contexts and for the courts to be more explicit about the
underlying function of defamation law in this area.
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